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Abstract  This  article  investigates  the  relationship  between  corporate  social  responsibility  and
earnings management.  Using  panel  data  methodology  for  a  sample  of  Spanish  non-ﬁnancial
companies between  2005  and  2012,  we  ﬁnd  a  negative  impact  of  corporate  social  responsi-
bility practices  on  earnings  management.  Corporate  social  responsibility  is  related  to  ethical
and moral  issues  concerning  corporate  decision-making.  Engaging  in  socially  responsible  activ-
ities not  only  improves  stakeholder  satisfaction,  but  also  has  a  positive  effect  on  corporate
reputation.
The results  show  that  corporate  social  responsibility  practices  may  be  an  organizational  device
that leads  to  more  effective  use  of  resources,  which  then  has  a  negative  impact  on  earningsaccruals;
Earnings  management
management  practices.
©  2016  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Earnings  management  has  recently  received  considerable
attention  both  from  regulators  and  the  popular  press.  Earn-
ings  management  can  be  deﬁned  as  the  alteration  of  ﬁrms’
reported  economics  performance  by  insiders  to  either  mis-
lead  some  stakeholders  or  to  inﬂuence  contractual  outcomes∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +34 868887919.
E-mail addresses: estergg@um.es (E. Gras-Gil), palacios@um.es
(M. Palacios Manzano), quino@um.es (J. Hernández Fernández).
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2340-9436/© 2016 ACEDE. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Healy  and  Wahlen,  1999;  Leuz  et  al.,  2003).  Managers
ay  be  inclined  to  manage  earnings  due  to  the  existence
f  explicit  and  implicit  contracts,  the  ﬁrm’s  relation  with
apital  markets,  the  need  for  external  ﬁnancing,  the  polit-
cal  and  regulatory  environment  or  several  other  speciﬁc
ircumstances  (Vander  Bauwhede,  2001).  These  deliberate
anagerial  actions,  contrived  to  disguise  the  real  value
f  a ﬁrm’s  assets,  transactions,  or  ﬁnancial  position,  have
egative  consequences  for  shareholders,  employees,  the
ommunities  in  which  ﬁrms  work,  society  at  large,  and  man-
gers’  reputations,  job  security  and  careers  (Zahra  et  al.,
005).
 an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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here  is  that  everything  else  being  equal,  ﬁrms  that  practice
stakeholder  management  will  perform  better  in  proﬁtability,
stability  and  growth  (Pesqueux  and  Damak-Ayadi,  2005).90  
Accounting  earnings  are  more  reliable  and  more  infor-
ative  when  managers’  opportunistic  behavior  is  controlled
hrough  a  variety  of  monitoring  systems  (Dechow  et  al.,
996).  After  several  recent  ﬁnancial  scandals,  there  has
een  an  international  trend  toward  developing  and  imple-
enting  corporate  governance  mechanisms  to  ﬁght  against
he  opportunistic  behaviors  that  have  undermined  investors’
redibility  in  ﬁnancial  information.  Corporate  governance
ttributes  help  investors  by  aligning  the  interests  of  man-
gers  with  the  interests  of  shareholders  and  by  enhancing
he  reliability  of  ﬁnancial  information  and  the  integrity
f  the  ﬁnancial  reporting  process  (Watts  and  Zimmerman,
986).
Decades  of  empirical  research  have  focused  on  the  fac-
ors  inﬂuencing  the  quality  of  earnings,  speciﬁcally  the
ccruals.  However,  there  is  also  increasing  attention  being
aid  to  the  managerial  activities  which  can  lead  to  the
anipulation  of  earnings.  Previous  studies  document  mixed
esults  regarding  the  association  between  corporate  social
esponsibility  (CSR)  and  transparent  ﬁnancial  reporting.  In
his  article,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  CSR  and
arnings  quality  by  using  Spanish  ﬁrms  from  2005  to  2012.
he  earnings  quality  is  measured  by  using  the  absolute  value
f  abnormal  discretionary  accruals  from  the  modiﬁed  Jones
odel.
CSR  is  related  to  ethical  and  moral  aspects  about
orporate  decision-making  and  behavior  and,  as  such,
ddresses  complex  issues  like  environmental  protection,
uman  resources  management,  health  and  safety  at  work,
ocal  community  relations,  and  relationships  with  suppli-
rs  and  customers  (Castelo  and  Lima,  2006).  Engaging  in
ocially  responsible  activities  not  only  improves  stakeholder
atisfaction,  but  also  has  a  positive  effect  on  corporate  rep-
tation  (Orlitzky  et  al.,  2003)  and  reduces  the  ﬁnancial  risk
ncurred  by  the  ﬁrm  (Orlitzky  and  Benjamin,  2001).
CSR  research  has  employed  a  variety  of  theories  and
ethodologies  to  study  the  potential  relationship  between
SR  activities  and  other  traditional  measures  of  a  ﬁrm’s
uccess  (Mahoney  and  Roberts,  2007,  p.  234).  Previous
tudies  focus  on  the  link  between  CSR  and  economic  or
nancial  ﬁrm’s  performance  (Moore,  2001;  Orlitzky  et  al.,
003;  Brammer  et  al.,  2007)  and  the  evidence  is  mixed.  As
orgensen  and  Knudsen  (2006)  note,  this  relationship  rep-
esents  the  most  questioned  area  of  CSR  (Angelidis  et  al.,
008);  while  a  lot  of  research  points  in  favor  of  a  mild  pos-
tive  relationship  (Aupperle  et  al.,  1985;  McGuire  et  al.,
988;  Orlitzky  et  al.,  2003;  Maron,  2006;  Wu,  2006;  Rodgers
t  al.,  2013)  this  connection  has  not  been  fully  established
Neville  et  al.,  2005;  Prado-Lorenzo  et  al.,  2008;  Park  and
ee,  2009)  and  the  mechanisms  through  which  ﬁnancial
erformance  is  enhanced  by  CSR  is  not  well  understood
Jawahar  and  McLaughlin,  2001;  Doh  et  al.,  2009).  The  liter-
ture  review  suggests  there  remains  a  lack  of  understanding
bout  how  CSR  initiatives  can  inﬂuence  on  accounting  qual-
ty  by  reducing  earnings  management.  Accordingly,  our  study
lls  this  gap  by  studying  the  effects  of  CSR  practices  on
iscretionary  accruals.
The  country’s  legal  system,  economic  development,  the
mportance  of  stock  markets  and  ownership  concentration
ll  affect  the  country’s  accounting  standards,  which  in  turn
ffect  the  country’s  quality  of  ﬁnancial  reporting.  We  use
panish  data  because  they  generally  reﬂect  an  institutional
h
UE.  Gras-Gil  et  al.
etting  similar  to  most  continental  countries,  classiﬁed  by  La
orta  et  al.  (1997)  as  French-origin  civil  law  countries,  where
igh  concentration  of  ownership,  weak  investor  rights  and
oards  which  are  not  independent  of  controlling  sharehol-
ers  are  prevalent.1 Fundamental  stakeholders  in  the  Span-
sh  corporations  include  banks  and  industrial  ﬁrms,  although
he  role  of  ﬁnancial  institutions  is  not  as  prevalent  as  in  other
ountries  such  as  Germany  and  Japan,  and  the  main  agency
roblem  arises  from  controlling  and  minority  shareholders,
s  occurs  in  most  European  countries.  The  international
ccounting  literature  provides  evidence  that  the  magnitude
f  earnings  management  is  on  average  higher  in  code-law
ountries  with  low  investor  protection  rights,  compared  to
ommon-law  countries  with  high  investor  protection  rights
Ali  and  Hwang,  2000;  Ball  et  al.,  2000;  Leuz  et  al.,  2003).
The  publication  of  new  European  rules  or  codes  of  best
ractice  for  publicly  listed  companies  has  further  intensi-
ed  the  discussion  in  Spain.  However,  Spain  is  a  country
n  which  corporate  social  responsibility  ranks  signiﬁcantly
ehind  others  such  as  the  USA  and  the  UK.  The  reason  must
e  sought  in  a culture  which,  to  date,  has  not  given  suf-
cient  importance  to  responsible  corporate  behavior.  The
panish  Accounting  Standards  Board  obliges  Spanish  ﬁrms
o  produce  and  disclose  an  environmental  report  in  their
nnual  accounts  owing  to  the  ﬁnancial  repercussions  this
nformation  has  on  ﬁrms  and  the  growing  demand  for  this
nformation  from  users.  But  social  information  is  considered
oluntary  information.
The  study  is  organized  as  follows.  We  review  earlier
esearch  and  provide  the  rationales  for  our  hypothesis  in
Literature  review  and  hypothesis  development’  section.
his  is  followed  by  a  presentation  of  the  methodology,
ncluding  how  the  sample  was  obtained  and  the  data  gath-
red  and  how  the  variables  used  were  measured  in  ‘Research
esign’  section.  We  describe  the  analysis  of  the  results  in
Results’  section  and  the  study  ends  with  the  main  conclu-
ions  in  ‘Conclusion’  section.
iterature review and hypothesis
evelopment
he  impact  of  CSR  on  economic  performance  has  received
onsiderable  attention  in  the  literature  over  the  past  three
ecades  (Waddock  and  Graves,  1997;  Grifﬁn  and  Mahon,
997;  McGuire  et  al.,  1988;  McWilliams  and  Siegel,  2000,
001;  Hillman  and  Keim,  2001;  Simpson  and  Kohers,  2002;
rlitzky  et  al.,  2003;  Coombs  and  Gilley,  2005;  Brine  et  al.,
006;  Margolis  et  al.,  2009;  Aras  et  al.,  2010).  The  instru-
ental  stakeholder  theory  (Donaldson  and  Preston,  1995;
onaldson,  1999;  Jones  and  Wicks,  1999)  argues  that  good
anagement  implies  positive  relationships  with  key  stake-
olders,  which,  in  turn,  improve  ﬁnancial  performance
Freeman,  1984;  Waddock  and  Graves,  1997).  The  main  idea1 La Porta et al. (1999) report that 85 per cent of Spanish ﬁrms
ave a controlling shareholder, in contrast to only 10 per cent in the
K or 20 per cent in the US.
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tCorporate  social  responsibility  and  earnings  management  
For  the  purpose  of  this  research,  stakeholder  theory  is
the  accepted  paradigm  to  explain  why  companies  involve
themselves  in  socially  responsible  activity  as  a  strategy  to
maximize  their  long-term  return  on  investment  --  sustain-
able  business  success,  by  recognizing  the  importance  of  each
stakeholder  group  and  incorporating  this  knowledge  into
their  corporate  strategy.  Because  the  stakeholders  control
resources  that  are  essential  for  the  existence  of  the  organi-
zation,  a  manager  who  wishes  for  the  continued  success  of
the  ﬁrm  has  to  strategically  devote  his  attention  to  the  needs
of  stakeholders.  From  this  perspective,  socially  responsi-
ble  ﬁrms  are  inclined  to  foster  long-term  relationships  with
stakeholders  rather  than  maximize  their  short-term  proﬁt.
The  basic  assumption  behind  this  theory  is  that  CSR  may  be
an  organizational  device  that  leads  to  more  effective  use
of  resources  (Orlitzky  et  al.,  2003),  which  then  has  a  posi-
tive  impact  on  corporate  ﬁnancial  performance.  Transparent
ﬁnancial  reporting  indicates  that  information  provided  to  a
ﬁrm’s  stakeholders  is  more  relevant  to  their  decision  mak-
ing.  In  this  regard,  providing  quality  earnings  is  closely
connected  to  CSR  activities,  especially  in  the  aim  to  meet
the  needs  of  the  stakeholders  (Choi  et  al.,  2013).
Previous  research  (Gelb  and  Strawser,  2001;  Chih  et  al.,
2008;  Choi  and  Pae,  2001)  argues  that  socially  responsible
ﬁrms  are  focused  not  only  on  increasing  current  proﬁts  but
also  on  fostering  future  relationships  with  stakeholders  (the
long-term  perspective  hypothesis).  From  this  perspective,
socially  responsible  ﬁrms  are  inclined  to  foster  long-term
relationships  with  stakeholders  rather  than  maximize  their
short-term  proﬁt  (Choi  et  al.,  2013).  Because  the  stakehol-
ders  control  resources  that  are  essential  for  the  existence  of
the  organization,  a  manager  who  wishes  for  the  continued
success  of  the  ﬁrm  has  to  strategically  devote  his  attention
to  the  needs  of  stakeholders  (Choi  et  al.,  2013).  In  support  of
this  view,  empirical  evidence  demonstrates  that  ﬁrms  that
are  more  committed  to  CSR  engage  less  in  earnings  man-
agement  (Chih  et  al.,  2008;  Hong  and  Andersen,  2011;  Choi
et  al.,  2013).
In  support  of  the  long-term  perspective  hypothesis,  the
study  of  Chih  et  al.  (2008)  investigates  whether  the  CSR-
related  features  of  1.653  corporations  in  46  countries  had  a
positive  or  negative  effect  on  the  quality  of  their  publicly
released  ﬁnancial  information  during  the  1993--2002  period.
They  argue  that  since  it  has  neither  been  documented,
nor  globally  tested  whether  CSR  mitigates  or  increases  the
extent  of  earnings  management,  they  studied  three  kinds  of
earnings  management:  earnings  smoothing,  earnings  aggres-
siveness,  and  earnings  losses  and  decreases  avoidance.  They
ﬁnd  that  the  type  of  relationship  between  CSR  and  earnings
management  depends  on  which  earnings  management  they
consider.  They  concluded  that  with  a  greater  commitment
to  CSR,  the  extent  of  earnings  smoothing  is  mitigated,  that
of  earnings  losses  and  decreases  avoidance  is  reduced,  but
the  extent  of  earnings  aggressiveness  is  increased.  So,  a  ﬁrm
with  CSR  in  mind  tends  not  to  smooth  earnings,  and  displays
less  interest  in  avoiding  earnings  losses  and  decreases.  Hong
and  Andersen  (2011)  study  the  relationship  between  CSR  an
earnings  management.  They  address  two  forms  of  earnings
management:  accruals  based  and  activity  based.  Their  sam-
ple  consists  of  non-ﬁnancial  U.S.  ﬁrms  from  the  time  period
1995--2005.  They  ﬁnd  evidence  that  ﬁrms  which  engage  in
CSR  are  less  likely  to  manage  earnings.
H
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The  paper  of  Choi  et  al.  (2013)  focuses  on  how  CSR  ratings
re  associated  with  earnings  quality  for  ﬁrms  with  different
wnership  structures.  They  use  a  sample  of  Korean  ﬁrms
rom  2002  to  2008.  They  ﬁnd  that  CSR  ratings  are  nega-
ively  correlated  with  the  level  of  earnings  management
hen  all  ﬁrms  are  considered.  However,  the  relationship  is
eaker  for  chaebol  ﬁrms  and  ﬁrms  with  highly  concentrated
wnership,  which  suggests  that  CSR  practices  can  be  abu-
ively  used  by  those  ﬁrms  to  conceal  their  poor  earnings
uality.
However,  an  opposite  view  posited  by  some  researchers
uggests  that  CSR  can  be  abused  by  managers  to  mask
heir  opportunistic  behaviors  (the  managerial  opportunism
ypothesis).  CSR  policies  can  be  used  by  managers  as
heir  entrenchment  strategy.  Consistent  with  this  argu-
ent,  Prior  et  al.  (2008)  document  a  positive  impact
f  earnings  management  on  CSR  by  using  archival  data
rom  a  multi-national  panel  sample  of  593  ﬁrms  from  26
ountries  between  2002  and  2004.  They  argue  that  earn-
ngs  management  practices  damage  the  collective  interests
f  stakeholders;  hence  managers  who  manipulate  earnings
an  deal  with  stakeholder  activism  and  vigilance  by  resort-
ng  to  CSR  practices.  They  also  suggest  that  executives  with
ncentives  to  manage  earnings  will  be  very  proactive  in
oosting  their  public  exposure  through  CSR  activities,  partic-
larly  in  ﬁrms  with  high  visibility.  Alternatively,  ﬁrms  with
ow  levels  of  earnings  management  have  fewer  incentives
o  seek  public  exposure  by  promoting  socially  responsible
ctivities.
Following  the  long-term  perspective  hypothesis,  Chih
t  al.  (2008)  afﬁrm  that  ﬁnancial  transparency  and  account-
bility  (both  as  vital  to  shareholders  as  they  are  to
mployees,  customers,  communities,  and  leaders  at  all  lev-
ls  of  society)  are  fast  becoming  principles  of  CSR  that  could
educe  the  extent  to  which  insiders  abuse  their  information
dvantage  over  outsiders.  So,  socially  responsible  ﬁrms  do
ot  undertake  earnings  management.  The  reason  underlying
his  is  that  a  ﬁrm  that  is  socially  responsible  does  not  hide
nfavorable  earnings  realizations  and,  therefore,  conducts
o  earnings  management  (Chih  et  al.,  2008).  In  this  regard,
hleifer  (2004)  interprets  that  earnings  manipulation,  which
any  people  ﬁnd  ethically  objectionable,  occurs  less  often
n  corporations  with  a  strong  commitment  to  social  responsi-
ility.  CSR  augments  transparency  and  reduces  the  number
f  opportunities  to  manage  (Chih  et  al.,  2008).  Similarly,
elb  and  Strawser  (2001)  ﬁnd  that  a  limited  sample  of  U.S.
rms  that  engage  in  socially  responsive  activities  provides
ore  informative  and/or  extensive  disclosures  compared
ith  companies  that  are  less  focused  on  advancing  social
oals.  By  equal  measure,  Shen  and  Chih  (2005)  ﬁnd  that
reater  transparency  in  accounting  disclosure  in  the  banking
ndustry  can  reduce  bank’s  incentive  to  manage  earnings.
In  line  with  previous  research  (Gelb  and  Strawser,  2001;
hih  et  al.,  2008;  Choi  and  Pae,  2001),  we  expect  that
ocially  responsible  ﬁrms  have  low  incentive  to  manage
arnings.  Alternatively,  ﬁrms  with  poor  CSR  activities  have
ore  levels  of  earnings  management.  These  arguments  lead
o  the  following  hypothesis:1.  The  extent  of  corporate  social  responsibility  is  nega-
ively  associated  with  the  level  of  earnings  management.
292  
Table  1  Sample  characteristics.
Number  of
ﬁrm-year
observations
Percentage  of
ﬁrm-year
observations
286
Panel  A:  Composition  by  year
2005  46  16.08
2006 51  17.83
2007 45  15.73
2008 31  10.84
2009 25  8.75
2010 17  5.94
2011 24  8.39
2012 47  16.44
Panel  B:  Composition  by  industry
Manufacturing  32  11.19
Construction  35  12.24
Commercial  140  48.95
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Total 286  100
esearch design
ample
he  sample  employed  in  this  study  consists  of  the  100
ost  reputable  Spanish  companies  according  to  the  Merco
ndex  for  the  period  2005--2012.  We  complement  these  data
n  corporate  responsibility  with  ﬁnancial  data  from  SABI
atabase.  Following  previous  literature  on  earnings  manage-
ent,  we  do  not  consider  ﬁnancial  ﬁrms  in  our  analysis  (Prior
t  al.,  2008;  Hong  and  Andersen,  2011).  The  ﬁnal  sample  is
n  incomplete  panel  data  of  286  ﬁrm-year  observations.
Panel  A  of  Table  1  shows  the  distribution  of  the  sample
y  year.  Panel  B  of  Table  1  provides  industry  breakdown.
odel  speciﬁcation
he  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  investigate  empirically  how
he  corporate  social  responsibility  in  Spain  inﬂuences  the
evel  of  earnings  management.  Following  previous  studies
Warﬁeld  et  al.,  1995;  Gabrielsen  et  al.,  2002)  we  employ
he  absolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals  [Abs(DACC)]  as
ur  measure  of  earnings  management.  In  order  to  evaluate
he  effect  of  CSR  on  discretionary  accruals,  we  regress  the
bsolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals  [Abs(DACC)]  on  CSR
nd  control  variables  (Model  1).
bs(DACC)it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1CSRit +  ˇ2LEVit +  ˇ3SIZEit +  ˇ4ROAit
+  ˇ5LISTit +  ˇ6BI  +  εit (1)
here  Abs(DACC)it is  the  absolute  value  of  discretionary
ccruals  in  year  t,  scaled  by  lagged  total  assets;  CSR  is
 is  the  natural  logarithm  of  MERCO  index  in  year  t;  LEV
s  end-of-year  total  liabilities  divided  by  end-of-year  total
quity;  SIZEit is  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  in  year
;  ROAit as  net  income  by  end-of-year  total  assets;  LIST  is  a
ummy  variable  (company  listed  =  1,  else  =  0);  BI  is  a vector
b
NE.  Gras-Gil  et  al.
f  industry  dummies  (Manufacturing  industry,  Construction
ndustry,  Commercial  industry,  Services).
easurement  of  earnings  management
rior  studies  used  discretionary  accruals  to  measure  the
xtent  of  earnings  management.  Discretionary  (abnormal)
ccruals  are  deﬁned  as  total  accruals  minus  estimated
ormal  (non-discretionary)  accruals,  where  the  estimated
ormal  accruals  can  be  derived  from  a number  of  discre-
ionary  accruals  models  widely  used  in  prior  studies  (Dechow
t  al.,  1995,  2003;  Larcker  and  Richardson,  2004;  Kotari
t  al.,  2005;  Jones  et  al.,  2008).  Since  earnings  man-
gement  can  involve  either  income-increasing  accruals  or
ncome-decreasing  accruals  to  meet  earnings  targets,  con-
istent  with  prior  studies  (Warﬁeld  et  al.,  1995;  Reynolds  and
rancis,  2000;  Klein,  2002;  Van  Tendeloo  and  Vanstraelen,
005;  Bowen  et  al.,  2008),  the  magnitude  of  absolute  dis-
retionary  accruals  is  used  in  this  study  to  assess  the  extent
f  earnings  management.  A  higher  magnitude  of  absolute
iscretionary  accruals  corresponds  to  a  greater  level  of  earn-
ngs  management,  or  lower  accounting  quality,  and  vice
ersa.
Following  Dechow  et  al.  (1995),  we  compute  the  accrual
omponent  of  earnings  as:
otal  Accrualsit =  (CAit −  Cashit)  −  (CLit −  STDit)
−  Depit (2)
here  CAit =  change  in  total  current  assets;  Cashit =
hange  in  cash  and  cash  equivalents;  CLit =  change  in
otal  current  liabilities;  STDit =  change  in  long-term  debt
ncluded  in  current  liabilities;  Depit =  depreciation  and
mortization  expenses.
We  use  the  cross-sectional  version  of  the  modiﬁed  Jones
1991)  model  to  estimate  the  non-discretionary  component
f  total  accruals  (TAC)  (DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994;  Yeo
t  al.,  2002;  Larcker  and  Richardson,  2004).
TACit
Ai,t−1
=  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 REVit
Ai,t−1
+  ˇ2 PPEit
Ai,t−1
+  εit (3)
For  each  year  and  industry  we  regress  total  accruals
TAC)  on  the  change  in  revenues  (REV)  and  the  level  of
ross  property,  plant  and  equipment  (PPE),  scaled  by  lagged
otal  assets  (At−1)  in  order  to  avoid  problems  of  heterosce-
asticity.  The  industry  classiﬁcation  is  based  on  the  Spanish
ational  Classiﬁcation  of  Economic  Activities  (CNAE)  made
y  the  National  Institute  of  Statistics  (INE).  The  estimation
f  the  regression  coefﬁcients  is  carried  out  using  all  Span-
sh  ﬁrms  available  in  the  SABI  database.  Industry-years  with
ewer  than  six  observations  are  excluded  from  the  analysis
DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994;  Park  and  Shin,  2004).
Using  the  estimates  for  the  regression  parameters,
ˆˇ0, ˆˇ1, ˆˇ2),  we  estimate  each  sample  ﬁrm’s  non-
iscretionary  accruals  (NDCA)  by  adjusting  the  change  in
ales  for  the  change  in  accounts  receivable  (AR)  to  allow
or  the  possibility  that  ﬁrms  could  have  manipulated  sales
y  changing  credit  terms  (Dechow  et  al.,  1995).
DCAit = ˆˇ0 + ˆˇ1 REVit −  ARit
Ai,t−1
+ ˆˇ2 PPEit
Ai,t−1
(4)
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Table  2  Descriptive  statistics  of  estimated  discretionary
accruals.
Mean  Median  SD  T  Sign
DACC-2005  0.010  −0.003  0.144  0.47  0.63
DACC-2006  0.020  0.000  0.130  1.09  0.27
DACC-2007  0.031  0.033  0.150  1.38  0.17
DACC-2008  −0.002  −0.012  0.123  −0.09  0.92
DACC-2009  −0.003  0.003  0.104  −0.14  0.88
DACC-2010  −0.030  −0.021  0.067  −1.84  0.08*
DACC-2011  −0.009  0.001  0.088  −0.50  0.62
DACC-2012  −0.008 −0.006 0.105 −0.52  0.60
DACC-Total 0.005 −0.002 0.123 0.68 0.49
Table  3  Variables  assessment  by  group  of  experts.
Group  of  experts  Merco  dimension  Rated  variable
Financial  Analysts  Economic-ﬁnancial
results
Economic-ﬁnancial
results
Quality  of  the
economic
information.
NGO Corporate  ethics
and  responsibility
Commitment  with
the  community.
Social  and
environmental
responsibility.
Consumer
Associations
Quality of  the
commercial  offer
Quality  of  product
--  service.
Respect  for
consumer  rights.
Trade Unions  Internal
reputation
Labor  quality.
Economic
Journalists
Corporate  ethics
and  responsibility
Transparency  of
information.
Accessibility.
Own: Merco (2013).
Table  4  Variables  analyzed  by  the  specialists.
Merco  dimension Rated  variable
Economic  and
ﬁnancial  results
Sheetproﬁt.
Proﬁtability.
Quality  of  the  economic  information.
Quality  of  the
commercial
offer
Product  values.
Brand  values.
Customer  service  and  care.
Internal
reputation
Labor  quality.
Ethical  and  professional  values.
Identiﬁcation  with  the  business
project.
Corporate  ethics
and
responsibility
Ethical  corporate  behavior.
Commitment  to  the  community.
Social  and  environmental
responsibility.
International
dimension  of
the  ﬁrm
Number  of  countries  in  which  it
operates.
Turnover  abroad.
International  strategic  alliances.
Innovation  Investments  in  R+D.
New  products  and  services.
3* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10 level.
DAC: Discretionary accruals using the modiﬁed Jones model.
And  we  deﬁne  discretionary  accruals  (DACCit)  for  ﬁrm  i
in  year  t  as  the  remaining  portion  of  total  accruals:
DACCit = TACit
Ai,t−1
−  NDCAit (5)
Following  previous  studies  (Warﬁeld  et  al.,  1995;
Gabrielsen  et  al.,  2002)  we  employ  the  absolute  value  of
discretionary  accruals  [Abs(DACC)]  as  our  measure  of  earn-
ings  management.  Table  2  shows  the  descriptive  statistics
of  estimated  discretionary  accruals,  and  t-test  to  examine
if  the  mean  discretionary  accruals  are  different  from  zero
did  not  ﬁnd  evidence  of  income  increasing  or  decreasing
manipulation  in  our  sample,  except  for  the  year  2010.
Independent  variable
We  use  the  MERCO  index  to  measure  the  extent  of  CSR.
MERCO  is  the  Spanish  Monitor  of  Corporate  Reputation,  a
tool  that  is  already  a  reference  for  large  companies  in  the
assessment  and  management  of  their  reputation,  as  it  is  the
only  Spanish  monitor  to  annually  evaluate  (since  2000)  the
reputation  of  the  companies  that  operate  in  Spain,  as  is  done
by  Fortune  or  The  Financial  Times.
Merco  seeks  to  measure  and  assess  the  various  facets  that
make  up  a  ﬁrm’s  reputation.  It  uses  a  process  based  on  a
variety  of  steps  that  are  aimed  at  collecting  data  from  dif-
ferent  sources  of  information.  The  processes  used  by  Merco
to  obtain  the  information  required  are:
1.  Interviews  with  directors.  The  aim  of  this  interview  is  to
ascertain  the  opinion  held  by  directors  of  the  most  impor-
tant  companies  in  Spain  about  the  corporate  reputation
of  ﬁrms  operating  in  our  country.  Within  the  appraisals
of  these  agents,  the  Merco  questionnaire  distinguishes
between  two  areas:  overall  rating,  in  which  a  director
rates  up  to  10  companies  which  he  or  she  considers  to
enjoy  the  best  reputation  in  his  or  her  country,  regard-
less  of  the  ﬁrms’  activities;  sectorial  rating,  in  which
those  answering  the  questionnaire  are  asked  to  indicate
the  two  ﬁrms  in  their  own  sector  that  enjoy  the  best
reputation.2.  Assessment  by  experts.  This  seeks  to  incorporate  in  the
corporate  reputation  rating  the  views  of  several  outside
agents.  In  this  stage,  the  90  ﬁrms  selected  in  the  previ-
ous  process  are  rated  by  5  groups  of  experts:  FinancialNew  channels.
Own: Merco (2013).
Analysts;  Consumer  Associations;  NGOs;  Trade  Unions;
and  Economic  Journalists  (Table  3).
.  Direct  Assessment.  The  aim  is  to  have  a  rating  by  quali-
ﬁed  specialists  in  Analysis  and  Research  of  the  relative
merits  and  corporate  reputation  presented  by  the  90
ﬁrms  selected  from  the  provisional  ranking.  This  rating
will  require  ﬁrms  to  accredit  their  reputational  values
via  a  questionnaire  and  documents  that  back  up  the
information  in  the  same.  The  variables  analyzed  by  the
specialists  are  shown  in  Table  4.
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Table  5  Weighting  percentages.
Overall  ranking  37%
Sectoral  ranking  8%
Financial  analysts  8%
Trade  unions  5%
Consumer  associations 5%
NGOs  5%
Economic  journalists 8%
Merco  tracking  8%
Merco  persons  8%
Direct  assessment  8%
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niﬁcantly  positive.  The  correlation  coefﬁcient  of  EM  with
leverage  and  listing  ﬁrms  are  signiﬁcantly  positive,  and  sig-
niﬁcantly  negative  with  size.Own: Merco (2013).
.  Merco  Tracking.  This  phase  seeks  to  obtain  a  rating  from
the  population  as  a  whole  for  the  reputation  of  the  ﬁrms
selected  and  to  detect  any  possible  evolution  of  the  rank-
ing.
Merco  Persons  is  a  monitor  that  seeks  to  identify  the
ttractiveness  of  the  various  ﬁrms  in  terms  of  places  to  work
n.  The  starting  point  here  is  the  views  of  various  agents:
he  ﬁrm’s  employees;  university  students;  former  students
f  business  schools;  the  general  population;  and  human
esource  managers.  It  also  uses  benchmarking  to  make  a
omparison  of  the  main  indicators  of  people  management.
The  ﬁnal  ranking  is  calculated  at  the  close  of  each
hases  outlined  as  the  weighted  sum  of  the  scores
btained  in  those  phases.  The  weighting  used  are  given  in
able  5.
Firms  which  do  not  achieve  at  least  8  points  from  other
rms  in  the  overall  ranking  or  that  receive  all  their  overall
oints  from  a  single  participating  ﬁrm,  aside  from  their  own,
re  excluded  from  the  ﬁnal  ranking.  If  necessary,  the  general
anking  components  are  given  a  weighting  to  remove  the
orporate  vote  effect.
Thus,  after  totaling  all  the  Merco  components  and  cor-
ecting  the  possible  undesired  effects  (group  votes,  massive
otes  for  organizations  of  small  importance,  etc.),  we  obtain
 score  index  over  10,000  and  the  ranking  derived  from  it,
hich  is  published  annually.
ontrol  variables
o  control  for  differences  in  earnings  management  incen-
ives,  we  include  the  following  variables  based  on  prior
esearch  (Ashbaugh,  2001;  Pagano  et  al.,  2002;  Tarca,  2004;
arth  et  al.,  2006;  Lang  et  al.,  2006).  First,  we  include
he  natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  (SIZE)  to  proxy  for
he  size  of  a  company.  The  political  cost  hypothesis  states
hat  larger  ﬁrms  are  more  likely  to  prefer  downward  earn-
ngs  management,  because  the  potential  for  government
crutiny  increase  as  ﬁrms  are  larger  and  more  proﬁtable
Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1990;  Young,  1999).  Closer  scrutiny
y  outsiders  can  potentially  reduce  managers’  opportuni-
ies  to  exercise  their  accounting  discretion  in  big  ﬁrms.  The
xpected  relationship  between  discretionary  accruals  and
rm  size  is  negative.
Second,  the  variable  leverage  (LEV)  controls  for  the  like-
ihood  of  bankruptcy.  A  higher  total  debt  to  asset  ratio
ndicates  a  higher  possibility  of  debt  covenant  violation, vE.  Gras-Gil  et  al.
hich  creates  an  incentive  to  increase  reported  earnings
horough  accruals-based  earnings  management.  According
o  Park  and  Shin  (2004),  ﬁrms  that  face  ﬁnancial  constraints
r  distress  have  an  incentive  to  adjust  earnings  upward  in
rder  to  avoid  a potential  loss  from  disclosing  a  ﬁnancial
roblem.  These  arguments  would  predict  a  positive  relation-
hip  between  discretionary  accruals  and  ﬁnancial  leverage.
ress  and  Weintrop  (1990)  and  Sweeney  (1994)  also  report
hat  ﬁrms  respond  to  debt  contracting  by  strategically  repor-
ing  discretionary  accruals.
Third,  the  return  on  assets  (ROA)  is  included  as  a  proxy
or  the  proﬁtability  of  a  ﬁrm.  Dechow  et  al.  (1995)  and
cNichols  (2000)  report  that  ﬁrms  with  abnormally  high
low)  earnings  have  positive  (negative)  shocks  to  earnings
hat  include  an  accrual  component  and  thus,  ﬁrms  with  high
low)  earnings  tend  to  have  high  (low)  accruals.  As  a  conse-
uence,  one  is  more  likely  to  ﬁnd  a  positive  relationship  for
he  most  proﬁtable  ﬁrms.
Finally,  Lang  et  al.  (2003)  ﬁnd  that  cross-listed  ﬁrms
ppear  to  be  less  aggressive  in  terms  of  earnings  man-
gement  and  report  accounting  data  that  are  more
onservative.  Firms  with  a  foreign  exchange  listing  are  pre-
umed  to  have  greater  incentives  to  report  transparently
ecause  they  are  subject  to  restrictions  imposed  by  differ-
nt  countries  and  are  exposed  to  a  higher  litigation  risk.
herefore,  we  include  a  dummy  variable  to  control  if  is  a
ross-listed  ﬁrm  or  not.  It  can  be  expected  that  earnings
uality  is  enhanced  when  listed  on  an  international  capital
arket  (Ball  et  al.,  2000,  2003).
We  also  include  industry  dummies  to  control  for  industry
ffects  on  earnings  management.
Following  Petersen  (2009), we  use  t-statistics  based  on
tandard  errors  clustered  at  the  ﬁrm  and  the  year  level,
hich  are  robust  both  to  heteroscedasticity  and  within-ﬁrm
erial  correlation.2
esults
escriptive  statistics
he  descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables  are  shown  in
able  6. The  mean  value  of  absolute  earnings  management
oves  around  0.089.  This  value  is  higher  in  our  sample  in
omparison  to  that  of  Choi  et  al.  (2013)  and  Prior  et  al.
2008). The  descriptive  analysis  shows  that  the  CSR  variable
natural  logarithm  of  Merco  index)  shows  a mean  value  of
.90.
In  Table  7,  the  absolute  value  of  discretionary  accruals
s  displayed  by  CSR  intervals,  suggesting  a  negative  relation
etween  CSR  and  discretionary  accruals  with  an  inﬂection
oint  for  low  levels  of  CSR.
The  correlation  matrix  between  variables  is  presented  in
able  8. The  correlation  coefﬁcient  of  CSR  with  size  is  sig-2 The results are similar if we cluster by ﬁrm and include dummy
ariables for each time period.
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Table  6  Descriptive  statistics.
Variable  Mean  Median  STD  Min  Max
Abs  (DACC)  0.089  0.061  0.085  0.0003  0.3668
CSR  7.904  7.908  0.534  7.071  9.210
LEV 0.645  0.664  0.203  0.118  1.512
SIZE  12.234  12.000  2.187  6  18
ROA 0.034  0.033  0.063  −0.454  0.390
Yes (%)  No  (%)
LIST  74.2  25.8
Where Abs(DACC) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals
using Jones modiﬁed model; CSR: natural logarithm of Merco
index in year t; LEV: as end-of-year total liabilities divided by
end-of-year total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets
in year t; ROA: as net income divided by end-of-year total assets;
LIST: dummy variable (company listed = 1, else = 0).
Table  7  Discretionary  accruals  by  CSR.
Range  of  CSR  Mean  Abs(DACC)
<10%  0.095
10--25% 0.092
25--50% 0.073
50--75% 0.085
>75% 0.075
Abs(DACC): absolute value of discretionay accruals using the
Table  9  Regressions  of  absolute  discretionary  accruals  on
independent  variables  and  control  variables.
Model:  Abs(DACC)it =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1CSRit +  ˇ2LEVt +  ˇ3SIZEit +  ˇ4ROAit
+  ˇ5 LISTit +  εit
Model
Variables  Estimated  coefﬁcientt-Statistic
Intercept  0.1949  4.71***
CSR  −0.012 −1.93**
LEV  0.0458  2.15**
SIZE  −0.0040  −1.72*
ROA  0.1348  2.29**
LIST  0.0064  0.75
Industry  dummiesYes
N  286
R2 (adjusted)  0.132
F 5.28***
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.10 level (two-
tailed).
** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (two-
tailed).
*** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed).
Where Abs(DACC) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals
using Jones modiﬁed model; CSR: natural logarithm of Merco
index in year t; LEV: as end-of-year total liabilities divided
by end-of-year total assets; SIZE: natural logarithm of total
assets in year t; ROA: as net income divided by end-of-year
total assets; LIST: dummy variable (company listed = 1, else = 0).
Models include industry dummies. Regressions are run using two-
way cluster standard errors (Petersen, 2009) at the time and ﬁrm
level which are robust to both heteroscedasticity and within-ﬁrm
m
f
e
conduct  less  earning  smoothing.  However,  these  results  are
in  contrast  with  the  ﬁndings  of  Prior  et  al.  (2008),  whomodiﬁed Jones model.
Multivariate  analysis
The  results  of  Model  1  are  presented  in  Table  9.  We  use
t-statistics  based  on  standard  errors  clustered  at  the  ﬁrm
and  the  year  level  (Petersen,  2009),  which  are  robust  both
to  heteroscedasticity  and  within-ﬁrm  serial  correlation.  The
results  show  a  consistently  signiﬁcant  negative  relationship
between  corporate  social  responsibility  practices  (CSR)  and
absolute  discretionary  accruals.  The  discretionary  accruals
are  substantially  lower  to  more  socially  responsible  ﬁrms,
and  this  difference  is  statistically  signiﬁcant  at  the  0.05
level.  These  results  provide  strong  evidence  for  the  effect  of
corporate  social  responsibility  practices  in  reducing  earnings
f
o
Table  8  Correlation  matrix.
Abs(DACC)  CSR  L
Abs  (DACC)  1
CSR  −0.056  1
LEV 0.133* −0.095  
SIZE −0.153** 0.154**
ROA 0.015  −0.048  −
LIST 0.172** −0.045  
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.05 level.
** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.
Where Abs(DACC) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals using
t; LEV: as end-of-year total liabilities divided by end-of-year total asse
income divided by end-of-year total assets; LIST: as a dummy variable
ﬁrm.serial correlation.
anagement  by  Spanish  ﬁrms.  Our  ﬁndings  provide  support
or  Hypothesis  1.
These  results  are  consistent  with  the  ﬁndings  of  Chih
t  al.  (2008),  who  argue  that  companies  with  greater  CSRound  a  positive  impact  of  earnings  management  practices
n  CSR.  They  explain  such  a  result  by  the  fact  that  managers
EV  SIZE  ROA  LIST
1
0.062  1
0.273** 0.056  1
0.018  −0.608** −0.058  1
 Jones modiﬁed model; CSR: natural logarithm of Merco in year
ts; SIZE: natural logarithm of total assets in year t; ROA: as net
 taking the value 1 if it is a listing ﬁrm and 0 if it is a no-listing
2 E.  Gras-Gil  et  al.
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Table  10  Regressions  of  cash  ﬂow  on  independent  varia-
bles and  control  variables.
Variables  Estimated  coefﬁcient  t-Statistic
Intercept  4.650  5.78***
CSR  −0.374 −2.48**
LEV  0.093  0.18
SIZE 0.964  16.77***
ROA  6.108  3.98***
LIST  −0.143  −0.47
Industry  dummies  Yes
N 286
R2 (adjusted) 0.819
F 123.73***
** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (two-
tailed).
*** Signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed).
Where FCF: natural logarithm of free cash ﬂow in year t; CSR:
natural logarithm of Merco index in year t; LEV: as end-of-year
total liabilities divided by end-of-year total assets; SIZE: natural
logarithm of total assets in year t; ROA: as net income divided
by end-of-year total assets; LIST: dummy variable (company
listed = 1, else = 0). Models include industry dummies. Regres-
sions are run using two-way cluster standard errors (Petersen,
m
e
(
F
r
r
T
o
e
1
i
a
C
T
u
m
e
s
a
t
t
r96  
ho  indulge  in  earnings  management  practices  have  two
easons  to  satisfy  stakeholders’  interest.  First,  there  is  a
re-emptive  reason-managers  anticipate  that  stakeholder
ctivism,  as  a  result  of  earnings  manipulation,  may  dam-
ge  their  position  in  the  ﬁrm.  A  good  way  of  avoiding  such
ctivism  is  to  satisfy  stakeholders’  interests.  Second,  an
ntrenchment  reason-manager  tends  to  collude  with  other
takeholders  as  a  hedging  strategy  against  disciplinary  ini-
iatives  from  shareholders  affected  detrimentally  by  these
arnings  management  practices.
In  terms  of  the  control  variables,  we  ﬁnd  that  absolute
iscretionary  accruals  are  decreasing  in  size,  but  increas-
ng  in  leverage  and  proﬁtability.  Agency  and  political  costs
xplain  why  ﬁrm  size  is  signiﬁcantly  associated  with  earn-
ngs  management.  The  coefﬁcient  size  is  signiﬁcant  and
egative.  Firm  size  is  clearly  a  business  characteristic  that
xhibits  differences  in  the  degree  of  earnings  management,
howing  that  high  size  ﬁrms  have  less  discretionary  accruals.
his  is  often  used  as  a  proxy  for  political  sensitivity.  Large
rms  with  large  proﬁts  may  try  to  manage  earnings  down-
ards  (Zimmerman,  1983;  Liberty  and  Zimmerman,  1986).
he  larger  the  ﬁrm,  the  more  likely  managers  are  to  choose
ncome-decreasing  accruals.
The  control  variable  Leverage  (Lev)  is  found  to  be  sig-
iﬁcantly  and  positively  related  to  absolute  discretionary
ccruals.  High  leverage  has  been  found  to  be  associated
ith  closeness  to  the  violation  of  debt  covenants  (Press
nd  Weintrop,  1990),  and  debt  covenant  violation  has  been
ound  to  be  associated  with  discretionary  accrual  choice
DeFond  and  Jiambalvo,  1994).  To  avoid  debt  covenant
iolation,  managers  of  highly  leveraged  ﬁrms  have  incen-
ives  to  make  income-increasing  discretionary  accruals.
owever,  high  leverage  is  also  associated  with  ﬁnancial
istress  (Beneish  and  Press,  1995).  According  to  DeAngelo
t  al.  (1994),  troubled  companies  have  large  negative
ccruals  related  to  contractual  renegotiations  that  provide
ncentives  to  reduce  earnings.  Our  results  are  consistent
ith  Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1978),  DeFond  and  Jiambalvo
1994),  Sweeney  (1994)  and  Dichev  and  Skinner  (2002).
obustness  test
o  examine  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  carry  out
n  additional  analysis.  Different  measures  of  discretionary
ccruals  are  used  in  the  literature  to  proxy  for  earnings
anagement.  There  exists  extensive  literature  relating  dis-
retional  accruals  and  free  cash  ﬂow  (Chung  et  al.,  2005;
echow  and  Ge,  2006;  Bukit  and  Iskandar,  2009).  These
tudies  establish  that  the  opportunity  for  earnings  man-
gement  is  higher  among  companies  with  high  surplus  free
ash  ﬂow.  Free  cash  ﬂow  (FCF)  is  deﬁned  as  the  excess  of
ash  available  to  a  ﬁrm  after  it  has  invested  in  all  positive-
et-present-value  projects  that  is  not  paid  out  in  dividends
Jensen,  1986).  Managers  of  low  growth  ﬁrms  with  high  FCF
re  expected  to  be  involved  in  non-value  maximizing  activ-
ties  including  an  increase  in  perquisite  consumption  and
ompensation  at  the  expense  of  shareholders  as  well  as  the
anipulation  of  accounting  number  (Jensen,  1989;  Shleifer
nd  Visny,  1989;  Lang  et  al.,  1991;  Christie  and  Zimmerman,
994).
We  therefore  rerun  our  model  but  using  like  dependent
ariable  the  free  cash  ﬂow  (Model  2).  Free  cash  ﬂow  is
t
b
a
e2009) at the time and ﬁrm level which are robust to both het-
eroscedasticity and within-ﬁrm serial correlation.
easured  by  operating  income  before  depreciation  minus
xpenses  such  as  tax  expense,  interest  expense  and  dividend
Lehn  and  Poulsen,  1989).
CFit =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1 CSRit +  ˇ2 LEVt +  ˇ3 SIZEit +  ˇ4 ROAit
+  ˇ5 LISTit +  εit
The  results  of  this  analysis  are  shown  in  Table  10.  Ours
esults  indicate  that  CSR  has  a negative  impact  on  FCF.  The
esults  can  be  interpreted  that  minor  CSR  high  free  cash  ﬂow.
hese  results  are  consistent  with  our  Model  1,  as  managers
f  high  free  cash  ﬂow  companies  have  incentive  to  engage  in
arnings  management.  The  results  again  support  Hypothesis
.  In  term  of  control  variables,  we  ﬁnd  that  free  cash  ﬂow  is
ncreasing  in  size  and  in  ROA.  The  coefﬁcients  are  signiﬁcant
nd  positive.
onclusions
he  motivation  for  ﬁrms  to  engage  in  CSR  has  been  an
nresolved  issue  for  which  previous  research  has  yielded
ixed  results.  While  some  researchers  suggest  that  CSR
ngagement  is  induced  by  the  long-term  perspectives  for
ustainable  operations  of  a  business,  others  argue  that  CSR  is
 practice  used  by  managers  who  are  involved  in  opportunis-
ic  behaviors.  Stakeholder  theory  is  the  accepted  paradigm
o  explain  why  companies  involve  themselves  in  socially
esponsible  activity  as  a  strategy  to  maximize  their  long-
erm  return  on  investment  --  sustainable  business  success,
y  recognizing  the  importance  of  each  stakeholder  group
nd  incorporating  this  knowledge  into  their  corporate  strat-
gy.  Stakeholder  theory  regards  CSR  as  a  success  medium  for
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managing  stakeholder  relationships  (Ullman,  1985;  Roberts,
1992).
In  this  article,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  CSR
and  earnings  quality  by  using  Spanish  ﬁrms  from  2005  to
2012.  For  the  analysis,  the  MERCO  index  is  employed  as
a  proxy  for  the  CSR  ratings  of  Spanish  ﬁrms.  The  earnings
quality  is  measured  by  using  the  absolute  value  of  abnor-
mal  discretionary  accruals  from  the  modiﬁed  Jones  model.
In  particular,  we  explore  the  thesis  that  managers  manipu-
late  earnings  in  order  to  obtain  private  beneﬁts,  and  through
these  practices  they  damage  the  interests  of  stakeholders.
A  ﬁrm  with  CSR  in  mind  tends  not  to  manipulate  earnings
because  it  is  not  a  responsible  practice.  And  such  ﬁrms,
therefore,  should  act  in  a  responsible  manner  when  repor-
ting  accounting  information.
The  empirical  results  conﬁrm  to  our  theoretical  conten-
tion.  In  particular,  we  ﬁnd  a  negative  impact  of  CSR  practices
on  earnings  management,  so  ﬁrms  that  are  more  committed
to  CSR  engage  less  in  earnings  management.  These  results
are  consistent  with  Chih  et  al.  (2008).  They  ﬁnd  that  compa-
nies  with  higher  social  responsibility  engage  in  less  earnings
smoothing  and  less  earnings  decrease/loss  avoidance.  Simi-
larly,  Shleifer  (2004)  interprets  that  earnings  manipulation,
which  many  people  ﬁnd  ethically  objectionable,  occurs  less
often  in  corporations  with  a  strong  commitment  to  social
responsibility.  As  suggested  by  Hong  and  Andersen  (2011),
more  socially  responsible  ﬁrms  have  higher  quality  accruals
and  less  activity-based  earnings  management,  both  of  which
impact  ﬁnancial  reporting  quality.
Socially  responsible  ﬁrms  are  inclined  to  foster  long-term
relationships  with  stakeholders  rather  than  maximize  their
short-term  proﬁt.  In  this  regard,  providing  quality  earnings
is  closely  connected  to  CSR  activities,  especially  in  that  both
aim  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  stakeholders.  This  reason
to  engage  in  social  responsibility  is  supported  and  supple-
mented  by  the  log  stream  of  empirical  research  that  ﬁnds
that  CSR  and  ﬁnancial  performance  are  positively  related
(Orlitzky  et  al.,  2003;  Brammer  et  al.,  2007).  In  this  regard,
as  Labelle  et  al.  (2010)  indicate,  higher  level  of  corporate
moral  development  is  associated  with  higher  quality  ﬁnan-
cial  reporting.
Analysis  of  the  determinants  of  accounting  quality  has
important  policy  implications.  Since  all  EU  countries  will
have  consistent  ﬁnancial  reporting  rules,  future  improve-
ments  in  accounting  quality  will  be  largely  dependent
on  changes  in  a  country’s  legal  and  political  system  and
ﬁnancial  reporting  incentives.  Changing  a  country’s  overall
institutional  infrastructure  is  difﬁcult,  so  addressing  ﬁnan-
cial  reporting  incentives  will  perhaps  be  the  least  costly
means  of  achieving  any  further  improvements  in  account-
ing  quality.  This  study  offers  insights  for  policy  makers  and
managers  interested  in  enhancing  CSR.
These  results  must  be  interpreted  with  some  limitations
in  mind.  The  study  is  not  free  from  external  validity  prob-
lems  caused  by  a  restricted  sampling  frame  and  small  sample
size.  Due  to  the  feasibility  of  collecting  CSR  and  ﬁnan-
cial  data,  the  study  includes  in  the  sample  only  the  most
reputable  companies  in  Spain.  To  enhance  generalizabil-
ity,  future  research  using  increased  numbers  of  observations
including  all  Spanish  companies  is  encouraged.
Furthermore,  the  results  show  some  increase  of  accruals
for  companies  with  a  medium-high  proﬁle  of  CSR  activities.
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his  may  reveal  a  potential  non-linear  relationship  (maybe
uadratic)  between  CSR  and  earnings  management.  Argu-
ents  taken  from  the  different  theories  also  may  support
his  idea.  Thus,  future  research  could  consider  this  issue  as
n  interesting  line  of  investigation.
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